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The Adaptive Dynamics Network at
IIASA fosters the development of new
mathematical and conceptual tech-
niques for understanding the evolution
of complex adaptive systems.
Focusing on these long-term implica-
tions of adaptive processes in systems
of limited growth, the Adaptive Dy-
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tists and institutions from around the
world with IIASA acting as the central
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Adaptive Dynamics series.
THE ADAPTIVE DYNAMICS NETWORK
The pivotal role of evolutionary theory in life sciences derives from its capability to
provide causal explanations for phenomena that are highly improbable in the physico-
chemical sense. Yet, until recently, many facts in biology could not be accounted for in
the light of evolution. Just as physicists for a long time ignored the presence of chaos,
these phenomena were basically not perceived by biologists.
Two examples illustrate this assertion. Although Darwin’s publication of “The Origin
of Species” sparked off the whole evolutionary revolution, oddly enough, the popula-
tion genetic framework underlying the modern synthesis holds no clues to speciation
events. A second illustration is the more recently appreciated issue of jump increases
in biological complexity that result from the aggregation of individuals into mutualistic
wholes.
These and many more problems possess a common source: the interactions of individ-
uals are bound to change the environments these individuals live in. By closing the
feedback loop in the evolutionary explanation, a new mathematical theory of the evolu-
tion of complex adaptive systems arises. It is this general theoretical option that lies at
the core of the emerging field of adaptive dynamics. In consequence a major promise
of adaptive dynamics studies is to elucidate the long-term effects of the interactions
between ecological and evolutionary processes.
A commitment to interfacing the theory with empirical applications is necessary both
for validation and for management problems. For example, empirical evidence indi-
cates that to control pests and diseases or to achieve sustainable harvesting of renewable
resources evolutionary deliberation is already crucial on the time scale of two decades.
The Adaptive Dynamics Network has as its primary objective the development of mathe-
matical tools for the analysis of adaptive systems inside and outside the biological realm.
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1 Introduction
Our understanding of the evolution of animal behavior has been greatly enhanced by the
use of game theory (Maynard Smith 1982). Classical games assume that a given individual
is equally likely to interact with any other member of the population and that the suc-
cess of any individual depends on the frequency of all other strategies represented in the
population. Yet natural environments possess a spatial dimension: individuals have lim-
ited mobility and interact locally with their neighbors. Only recently have attempts been
made to incorporate this important property into the study of evolutionary games. Dif-
ferent approaches have been followed: numerical simulations of “games on grids” (Nowak
and May 1992; Lindgren and Nordahl 1994; see Chapter 8 in Dieckmann et al. 2000);
analytical study of correlation equations for games on lattices (Nakamaru et al. 1997;
see Chapter 13 in Dieckmann et al. 2000); and analytical study of “replicator–diffusion”
equations (e.g., Vickers 1989; Vickers et al. 1993; Ferrie`re and Michod 1995, 1996; see
Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al. 2000). In this chapter we restrict ourselves to the last of
these methodologies and provide an introduction to its mathematical underpinnings and
biological applications. Elements of a general theory of replicator–diffusion equations are
expounded in detail in articles by Vickers (1989), Hutson and Vickers (1992), Vickers et al.
(1993), and Cressman and Vickers (1997). We present an overview of these important re-
sults in Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 show how replicator–diffusion models can be used to
study spatial versions of the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, a well-known metaphor
for evolution toward cooperation between genetically unrelated individuals (Trivers 1971;
Axelrod and Hamilton 1981; Maynard Smith 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998).
2 Invasion in Time- and Space-continuous Games
When considering the adaptive dynamics of long-term evolution, the crucial question is
whether a mutant phenotype can invade resident phenotypes (Metz et al. 1992; Diekmann
et al. 1996; Geritz et al. 1997; Dieckmann 1997). Obviously, the very nature of an invasion
event requires individual mobility, while the game theoretical context requires interactions
between individuals that share the same neighborhood. This creates the need for deriving
invasibility criteria that explicitly account for spatial effects in the dynamics of mutant
invasion. Much of the theory of invasion in time- and space-continuous games is relatively
new. This section presents the basic ideas needed for subsequent applications and points
to some unsolved questions.
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Replicator–diffusion equations
Hereafter, the payoff matrix of a game is denoted by A. We set A = [aij], where aij is
the payoff to an individual who plays strategy i against an opponent who plays j. Let Q
be a probability vector composed of qi denoting the proportion of individuals who play
strategy i. Taylor and Jonker (1978) have suggested incorporating continuous time into
the dynamics of games using so-called replicator equations
dqi
dt
= qi
[
(AQ)i −QTAQ
]
(1 ≤ i ≤ k) , (1)
where k is the number of strategies, (AQ)i denotes the ith coordinate of vector AQ, and
the exponent T indicates vector transpose. This model stems from the idea that the
growth rate of a strategy is equal to its absolute payoff (AQ)i. Hence the abundance
of strategy i is described by unlimited exponential growth, according to the equation
dni/dt = [(AQ)i]ni. One can then write qi as ni divided by the total population density
(i.e., the sum of the densities of all strategies) and use the latter equation to recover
Equations (1). The replicator equation expresses the fact that the change in any strategy’s
frequency is determined by the population growth rate of that strategy compared with
the average population growth rate, that is, the average payoff QTAQ. Equations (1)
are important because there is a relationship between the stable equilibrium points of
Equations (1) and the game’s evolutionarily stable strategies, or ESSs (Zeeman 1980;
Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). [We recall that an ESS is a strategy that, when common
in the population, cannot be invaded by any small group of individuals playing a different
strategy; see, e.g., Maynard Smith (1982).]
The inclusion of continuous space is not so straightforward. If all individuals move at
the same rate, we are on a well-worn trail (see Hadeler 1981). But it is quite reasonable to
expect that the dispersal rate is affected by, or indeed part of, the strategy chosen. Using
the standard diffusion approximation of a random walk (see Chapter 22 in Dieckmann
et al. 2000), Vickers (1989) introduced the following “replicator–diffusion equations”:
∂ni
∂t
= ni
(
(AN )i
m
− N
TAN
m2
)
+ µi
∂2ni
∂x2
(1 ≤ i ≤ s) , (2)
where each strategy is characterized by its own diffusion (or mobility) rate µi. Here,
ni(x, t) is the density of the i-strategists at location x and time t and m(x, t) is the total
density at x and t (m = n1 + n2 + · · ·+ ns). For simplicity, we drop the x and t variables
in the equations when there is no ambiguity.
Like the replicator equations, this model assumes that an individual playing strategy
i and located at x at time t receives the aij payoff if it interacts with a neighbor playing
strategy j, which occurs with a probability approximated by the frequency ni/m of j-
players at x and t. A bookkeeping of the payoff contributions to strategy i from all different
j strategies yields the first part of the growth rate of strategy i [the bracketed term in
Equations (2)]. In addition there is a regulatory, negative term that accounts for the
fact that local densities stay bounded. This regulatory term takes the form of a discount
precisely equal to the average payoff earned at location x at time t (which is calculated
by summing over i the average payoff to strategy i weighted by its frequency ni/m at
location x and time t). It must be stressed that this discounting term is a very special
one, chosen only for mathematical convenience. No particular physiological or behavioral
mechanism is known that lets individuals adapt their per capita birth and death rates to
local circumstances so as to keep the local population averages of these quantities exactly
zero at all times. Cressman and his coworkers (see Cressman and Dash 1987; Cressman
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and Vickers 1997) have elaborated on this issue by assuming that an individual’s fitness
is composed of its payoff in the contest with other strategies together with a background
fitness that is common to all strategies. Their approach has the merit of relating the
spatial dynamics of the game to individual life-history traits, but it is hampered by very
demanding mathematics (Cressman and Vickers 1997). In Section 3, we take advantage of
the great mathematical tractability of replicator–diffusion equations (2) to explore invasion
issues in the context of spatial games between cooperative and selfish players. Hutson and
Vickers (1995; see also Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al. 2000) have used the background
fitness model of local population regulations to address the same problem. In Section 4
we see that their results are consistent with those obtained through the analysis of the
simpler replicator–diffusion equations.
Replicator–diffusion equations form a distinct class of reaction–diffusion models be-
cause of their specific reaction term. Equations (2) assume that space is one-dimensional
and reduces to an “x-axis.” The formalism, however, straightforwardly carries over to
higher dimensions (see Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al. 2000 for a detailed account of the
rationale of reaction–diffusion models). If the spatial domain is bounded, impermeable
boundary conditions are imposed.
Invasibility and evolutionary stability
A few mathematical results are available to investigate the invasibility or evolutionary sta-
bility of a strategy in a spatial game described by replicator–diffusion equations. They all
relate the dynamics of the spatial model given by Equations (2) to its nonspatial counter-
part, Equations (1). Here, we state the mathematical theorems in a self-contained manner
to make them unambiguously applicable to any particular model that falls under their
scope. The spatial iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) offers an opportunity to operate
this machinery, as we will see in Section 3.
Vickers (1989) provided the first stability analysis of the replicator–diffusion equations.
He found that an interior ESS is so stable that it precludes any spatial dependence:
Proposition 1 If matrix A has an interior ESS, that is, an ESS for the replicator equations
[Equations (1)] given by a frequency vector Q with all nonzero coordinates, then this ESS
is also stable in the spatial game governed by Equations (2) for all choices of the diffusion
coefficients µi.
The situation becomes much more complicated if there is no interior ESS in the ho-
mogeneous game. Hutson and Vickers (1992) addressed the case where there are only two
strategies and each pure strategy is an ESS. In the absence of spatial effects each ESS
is, by definition, stable. The inclusion of diffusion creates the possibility of a traveling
wave that in effect replaces one ESS with the other. To state Hutson and Vickers’ main
theorem, we first recast the payoff matrix A as
A =
[
α 0
0 β
]
(3)
by setting α = a11−a21 and β = a22−a12, an operation that does not affect the dynamics.
To ensure that each pure strategy is an ESS, α > 0 and β > 0. Hutson and Vickers (1992)
investigated the invasion of a region dominated by one strategy – for example, for x > 0
strategy 1 is played by almost all individuals and for x < 0 strategy 2 is prevalent.
Proposition 2 Assume that A has the form (3) with α > 0 and β > 0. There then exists
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a function F such that, if
β
α
> F
(
µ1
µ2
)
, (4)
a traveling wave front with positive speed (i.e., moving from x = −∞ to x =∞ along the
spatial axis) will connect the two homogeneous pure population equilibria. The function
F is well approximated over the range 0.05–20 by F (u) ≈ u−0.61.
The following statements explain the importance of Proposition 2 for analyzing appli-
cations.
• Proposition 2 states that if inequality (4) is satisfied, then a traveling wave replaces
a pure strategy-1 population with a pure strategy-2 population. If the inequality
is reversed, the sign of the wave speed becomes negative and strategy 2 replaces
strategy 1 in a traveling wave. There is virtually no room for coexistence, except
perhaps in the atypical boundary case β/α = F (µ1/µ2). Thus, in a generic two-
strategy game where both strategies are ESSs, a traveling wave necessarily exists
and replaces one strategy with the other.
• If the payoffs α and β are not influenced by the mobility rates µ1 and µ2, condition
(4) asserts that the dominating strategy must have large payoffs and small diffusion
rates. (In the IPD, however, the payoffs do depend on the mobility rates.)
• There is strong numerical evidence to support the claim that the propagation of
a traveling wave replacing strategy 1 with strategy 2 is strictly equivalent to the
growth of a localized clump of individuals playing strategy 2 amid a “sea” of players
using strategy 1. Accepting this conjecture, inequality (4) reads as a criterion of
invasibility.
While Proposition 1 assumes that the replicator equation admits a stable solution
corresponding to an interior (mixed) ESS, Proposition 2 addresses the case where the
(ESS) equilibria associated with each pure strategy are the only ones. Vickers et al.
(1993) have shed some light on the case where the replicator equation admits an internal
stable equilibrium which is not an ESS. This is an interesting case because, in the spatial
context, it may lead to the formation of patterns.
Let Qˆ be an internal, stable solution to the replicator equation. Assuming that Qˆ is
not an ESS means that it is invadible, and the simplest situation here arises when Qˆ can
be invaded by a pure strategy (say, strategy 1). Vickers et al. (1993) proved the following
theorem.
Proposition 3 If strategy 1 can invade Qˆ, that is, a11 > (Qˆ
TA)1, then there exists a
combination of mobility rates µi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) such that Qˆ is not spatially stable.
This statement is important in light of Turing’s (1952) well-known idea that spatial
patterns are often associated with equilibria which are stable in the nonspatial system (i.e.,
without diffusion) and unstable with respect to spatially heterogeneous perturbations.
This phenomenon is the so-called Turing instability (see Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al.
2000). In the framework of replicator–diffusion equations, Vickers et al. (1993) have raised
three important points.
• A bifurcation analysis shows that this pattern-formation mechanism is operative in
spatial games under the conditions of Proposition 3.
• There must be at least three pure strategies in the game for Proposition 3 to apply.
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• A converse of Proposition 3 holds when there are exactly three strategies. If Qˆ resists
invasion by any pure strategy, then it is spatially stable and no spatial pattern can
be produced.
Patterns arising from the Turing instability vary in space but are constant in time. Yet
variations in space and time are essential features of the dynamics of ecological systems.
Vickers et al. (1993) have provided a numerical example of a three-strategy game that
exhibits another kind of instability (namely, a Hopf bifurcation) that results in spatial
patterns which are periodic in time. It should be noted that a general theory of the
bifurcations of the three-strategy game is still pending.
3 Invasion of Tit For Tat in Games with Time-limited
Memory
In Chapter 8 in Dieckmann et al. 2000, Nowak and Sigmund expound on the basics of
the IPD game. Here, we refer to concepts and notations introduced by these authors.
Investigating the relative invasibility of well-known strategies like the cooperative Tit For
Tat (TFT ) strategy and the selfish Always Defect (AD) strategy serves to demonstrate
some of the mathematical techniques introduced in the previous section.
The spatial struggle of Tit For Tat and Always Defect
The IPD has proved tremendously fruitful as a paradigm for studying the evolution of
cooperation. Game theorists originally identified the TFT strategy as the most robust
and stable strategy in the IPD (Axelrod and Hamilton 1981). Subsequent theoretical
developments (Nowak and Sigmund 1992, 1993) emphasized that the TFT strategy could
be the first step toward cooperation in a world of unconditional defectors playing AD. To
explain the emergence of cooperation, it is therefore crucial to understand how TFT can
gain a foothold in a population dominated by AD.
A major problem concerning the nonspatial IPD is that it fails to convincingly settle
this issue. Depending on the probability w of continuing the game, either AD is the
only ESS, hence TFT has no chance to invade, or both AD and TFT are ESSs (which
happens when w is sufficiently large), implying that TFT can invade an established AD
population only if the TFT frequency exceeds a certain threshold. Because the nonspatial
IPD assumes an infinite population, this result means that an initially finite group of TFT
newcomers will never spread. It has long been claimed that small clusters of finite size
should still have a chance of spreading, because cooperators within a cluster experience a
high probability of interacting with each other. To weigh this claim, one might compare
the average payoff earned by a TFT within the cluster with the AD payoff averaged over
the whole population. In doing so, however, one would overlook TFT–AD interactions
which locally influence the payoff to AD players in the vicinity of the cooperative focus
– a local payoff likely to be of critical importance to determining the eventual fate of the
TFT population. Numerical examples (Nowak and May 1992, 1993) based on cellular
automata demonstrate that local interactions have a significant effect on the outcome of
the game between cooperators and defectors. For this reason, there has been much interest
in setting up versions of the IPD that specifically account for spatial dynamics and local
contests.
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A replicator–diffusion model
We now assume that TFT and AD players are free to move. We wish to describe the game
using a replicator–diffusion equation. This amounts to writing down the payoff matrix A
taking into account the organisms’ mobility and other individual traits (mortality and
interaction time). In the nonspatial game, the parameters are the payoffs S, P , R, T (see
Chapter 8 in Dieckmann et al. 2000), and the probabilityw that two particular interacting
individuals continue their interaction in the next round of the game. In the spatial version
of the game, that probability w is influenced by the individuals’ traits (including the
mobility rates), and some work is required to make this relationship explicit.
Microscopic description of interactions.
We first describe an individual-based model of the population. We assume that each
individual in the population occupies a position in space that is a function of time. The
population is distributed along a one-dimensional axis: it can be thought of as spread along
a coastline or a river bank; or if the environment is really two-dimensional, variations in
the strategy mix may occur in one direction only. For the purpose of defining local
interactions, we regard space as being divided into discrete contiguous cells of length ∆l
so that each cell contains two individuals at any time. Interactions are initiated between
two individuals located in the same cell. Thus ∆l defines the “interaction length,” which
we assume to be constant across space. Each interaction lasts ∆t units of time, which we
define as the “interaction time” of the game. Interactions occur consecutively, without
any “rest time” in between.
The payoffs S, P , R, and T determine the per capita reproductive rate. Thus if the
payoff is S, for example, to each individual of a group of size n, then their numbers increase
at a rate Sn in the absence of all other effects. We assume that interactions have no direct
effect on individual mortality. Let us consider a TFT player within a given cell, and let
pT and pD be the probabilities that the partner is a TFT or an AD player, respectively.
Then the reproductive success of the nominal TFT player during the small time interval
∆t is
• R∆t if the co-player is a TFT, which occurs with probability p;
• P∆t if the co-player is a defector already encountered on the previous interaction,
which occurs with probability pDw;
• T∆t if the co-player is a defector not encountered on the previous interaction, which
occurs with probability pD(1−w).
Here w denotes the probability that the same two individuals located in a given cell at
time t were also sharing a cell at time t−∆t.
From microscopic interactions to macroscopic dynamics.
Mobility is modeled by a random walk, and we make the classical diffusion approximation.
Thus we define mobility (or diffusion) rates for TFT and AD players, denoted by µT and
µD , respectively. Then the derivation of w is straightforward (see Ferrie`re and Michod
1996, for details) and yields
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w =
[
4
√
pi
√
(µT + µD)∆t
]
−1
×
∫∫
u,v∈[−∆l/2,∆l/2]
exp
[
− (u− v)
2
4(µT + µD)∆t
]
du dv .
(5)
For small cell length ∆l, the following approximation holds [Equation (7) in Ferrie`re and
Michod 1996]:
w ≈ 2√
pi
∆l√
∆t
µTµD
(µT + µD)5/2
. (6)
We derive a replicator–diffusion model of the population dynamics by letting ∆l go to
zero and rescaling time appropriately, such that ∆l/
√
∆t approaches a positive constant
υ:
∆l√
∆t
→ υ 6= 0 . (7)
Now we can define the densities of TFT and AD as continuous functions of space and
time, denoted by nT (x, t) and nD(x, t). Let m be the total density nT + nD . We have
pT = nT /m, pD = nD/m; thus, the TFT reproductive rate is
nT
m
R+
nD
m
[wP + (1−w)S] . (8)
Likewise, the AD reproductive rate is
nD
m
P +
nT
m
[wP + (1−w)T ] . (9)
The payoff matrix of the replicator–diffusion game equations (2) follows readily:
A =
[
R wP + (1−w)S
wP + (1−w)T P
]
, (10)
with w given by
w =
2υ√
pi
µTµD
(µT + µD)5/2
. (11)
Notice that for consistency with the assumption made above – that the interaction length
is constant across space – the total density should vary very slowly in time and smoothly
across space. Using numerical integration of Equation (2) with A given by Equations (10)
and (11), we have found this requirement to be fulfilled when µT and µD were not vastly
different.
A spatial version of Hamilton’s rule
To analyze the replicator–diffusion model of the IPD by means of the theory developed
in Section 2, we must first consider the nonspatial version of the system and investigate
its equilibria. With this aim in view, it is convenient to introduce a cost–benefit param-
eterization of the IPD payoffs (Brown et al. 1982). Assume that a cooperator exhibits
some behavior that benefits the fitness of its partner, the recipient, by an amount b which
is larger than 0. The benefit is independent of the recipient’s behavior. By providing
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Figure 1 Mobility rates leading to an invasion of an established AD population by a wave of TFT players.
The model assumes time-limited memory and is given by the system of replicator–diffusion equations (2).
The payoff matrix A is specified by Equations (10) and (11) with υ = 1. The shaded area contains all
pairs of mobility rates µT , µD such that the coefficient of reciprocation H(µT , µD) is larger than the cost–
benefit ratio c/b (fixed at 0.22). For given defectors’ mobility µD larger than a minimum value (≈0.11) –
for example, µD = 1.0 (dashed line) – there is an interval (A,B) of µT mobility rates over which a TFT
invading wave displaces a resident AD population.
its partner with the benefit b, the cooperator incurs a cost −c, c > 0. Again, this cost
is independent of the recipient’s behavior. If the effects on fitnesses are additive, with
a baseline value taken to be 1, one obtains the following parameterization: T = 1 + b,
R = 1 + b− c, P = 1, S = 1− c.
Using this parameterization, we see that the replicator equation of the game admits
two stable equilibria (corresponding to each pure strategy) whenever
w ≥ c
b
, (12)
which is the condition found by Brown et al. (1982) for TFT and AD to simultaneously
be ESSs in the standard, nonspatial game. Then Proposition 2 asserts that there exists a
traveling wave replacing AD with TFT if
w
1 + (1−w)F (µT /µD) >
c
b
. (13)
This inequality provides a Hamilton rule (Hamilton 1964) for the increase of cooperation in
a nonsocial, spatial environment. The left-hand side (hereafter denoted by H) generalizes
the coefficient of reciprocation defined for the nonspatial IPD (Brown et al. 1982), which
gives the probability that an individual’s cooperative act is returned via reciprocation from
other TFT. The right-hand side of the inequality is the cost–benefit ratio of cooperation.
This spatial Hamilton rule can be further extended to include a cost to mobility (Ferrie`re
and Michod 1996).
Inequality (13) defines a set of mobility rates µT and µD that cause an invasion of
defectors AD by TFT : a traveling wave replaces AD with TFT. All other parameters
being fixed, this set is delineated by the c/b isoclines drawn on the surface H(µT , µD) (see
Figure 1). [Notice that if a pair µT , µD satisfies inequality (13), then it automatically
meets inequality (12).] We find that a range of mobility rates exists for which TFT can
invade provided that AD mobility exceeds a minimum threshold. In general, this range
includes the mobility rate of resident defectors, µD, but it is skewed around µD so that
TFT players may be much more mobile than defectors and yet successfully displace them.
As a consequence of the particular form taken by the function F in Equation (13)
[F (u) ≈ u−0.61, see Proposition 2], a condition for the invasion by rare ADs of a TFT
population is obtained by reversing inequality (13). (Note that the particular form of F is
8
only an approximation. Dealing with the exact function would call for further investiga-
tion.) This condition determines the stability of TFT once established. It turns out that
TFT is jeopardized by AD endowed with either high or very low mobility (see Figure 1).
Also, TFT is immune to invasion for a much wider range of AD mobility rates when its
own rate of mobility increases. Thus, by moving at higher rates, cooperators find more
efficient protection against reinvasion by AD.
Why mobility can favor Tit For Tat
To answer this question and to give some intuitive understanding of the above results,
Ferrie`re and Michod (1995) have developed an auxiliary model focusing on the stochastic
motion of the players. Heuristically, the growth of an initially small cluster relies on two
conditions: first, that the cluster can spread outward from the edge, and, second, that
its core is not destroyed by AD intruders (Axelrod 1981; Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza 1982;
Wilson et al. 1992). The first condition is ensured whenever TFT s can make safe moves
toward the front of the invasion, that is, whenever TFT pioneers can avoid being suckered
as they move outward. A TFT pioneering to the front of an invasion will not be suckered
there if it can get assorted with another TFT also on a pioneering move or if it moves
together with a known AD (in which case it will retaliate). The auxiliary model set up
by Ferrie`re and Michod (1995) shows that both conditions are more likely to be met for
high (but not too high) mobility in TFT and AD. Likewise, the second condition is met
if a defector entering the core of a TFT cluster gets assorted there with another AD or
if it undergoes retaliation by a TFT also moving back to the core. Again, the likelihood
that either case will be realized is maximized at high TFT and AD mobility rates. To
summarize, the following events are crucial for the emergence of TFT and are enhanced
by significant mobility of the players: assortative meetings of TFT s at the front of an
invasion or of ADs in the core of the cluster, and tracking of ADs by TFT s toward the
front or toward the core.
4 Invasion of Tit For Tat in Games with Space-limited
Memory
There are two important assumptions underlying the IPD replicator–diffusion equations
investigated in the previous section. First, the memory is “space-extended” but “time-
limited.” That is, a player can recognize its opponent wherever they meet, but the player’s
memory is limited to the last round of the game. Second, the local density of each strategy
is assumed to vary very slowly, in agreement with the assumption made in the microscopic
description of the population that the spatial axis can be divided into contiguous cells
of constant length, each cell containing two individuals. Hutson and Vickers (1995) have
developed a different reaction–diffusion model of the spatial IPD where these assumptions
have been modified or relaxed. In the Hutson–Vickers model, memory is not restricted
to the last interaction but instead is space-limited: a player can remember any of its
previous opponents provided that neither has moved out of the cell where they first met.
Furthermore, a cell may now contain a variable number of players. The goal of this section
is to present some important results drawn from their approach after examining structural
differences between this model and the previous game-diffusion equations.
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Model description
The Hutson–Vickers model is fully expounded in Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al. 2000
(Section 22.2, A model for invasion of Tit For Tat). Here, we content ourselves with
highlighting the specificities of this model.
• Local interactions. The spatial axis is still divided into contiguous cells of constant
length l, but now each cell may contain many individuals. Opponents of any player
in a given cell are drawn randomly within that cell.
• Repeated interactions. The Hutson–Vickers model relaxes the assumption that local
population size varies on a slow time scale. Consequently, the probability w of
players meeting is no longer a constant. In their model, Hutson and Vickers (1995)
recast w into a dynamic “getting-to-know” function [denoted by g(x, t)] that gives
the proportion of AD (or TFT ) players within a cell that a typical TFT (or AD)
player has already met. They further define G = gnTnD as the number density of
TFT–AD pairs within a cell that have already met.
• Memory. Memory is not limited to the last round. A TFT player recognizes an
opponent on a second or subsequent occasion provided that neither has left the cell
where the encounter occurred. This is in contrast with the game-diffusion model,
where recognition may occur wherever the encounter takes place, but only on the
next interaction.
• Population regulation. The per capita death rate is made density dependent. There-
fore, it varies in space and time (but, as before, it is not influenced by the outcome
of the game).
Main properties of the model
The analysis of the Hutson–Vickers model stems from ideas similar to those underlying
Proposition 2. First, one has to determine the possible population equilibria assuming that
player densities are spatially homogeneous. One may then turn to the effect of locally
perturbing the stable equilibria, thereby mimicking the effect of an invasion attempt.
When players have spatially homogeneous distributions, their densities and the getting-
to-know function depend only on t. Then the model reduces to a system of ordinary
differential equations [set ∂2u/∂x2 = 0 and ∂2v/∂x2 = 0 in Equations (22.17) and replace
all partial derivatives with respect to t with ordinary derivatives in Equations (22.17) and
(22.19) of Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al. 2000]. Standard techniques of local stability
analysis can now be used. The system turns out to have one of three simple structures:
1. There are stable equilibria with only TFT -players and only AD-players, and an
unstable coexistence equilibrium.
2. There is a stable pure AD state and the only other equilibrium, that with just TFT
players, is unstable.
3. In addition to the equilibria of structure (2), there are two coexistence states (one
stable and one unstable) of TFT and AD.
The next step aims at determining whether a pure TFT state may evolve starting from
initial conditions where TFT players are localized within an established AD population.
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Figure 2 Mobility rates leading to an invasion of an established AD population by a wave of TFT players.
The model assumes space-limited memory and can be written as a system of reaction–diffusion equations
[see Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al. 2000, Equations (22.17) and (22.19)]. The shaded area contains all
pairs of mobility rates µT , µD for which there exists a traveling wave replacing AD with TFT. For given
defectors’ mobility µD smaller than a maximum value (≈0.0021) – for example, µD = 0.0018 (dashed line)
– there is an interval (A,B) of µT mobility rates over which invasion by TFT occurs. Model parameters:
α = 1.3725, β = 0.9, γ = 1.45, δ = 1, k = 4, b = 0 = d, σ = 1, θ = 100(µT + µD).
This requires that the homogeneous TFT state must be stable, which actually happens
with structure (1). Thus, we must deal with a situation similar to that handled by Propo-
sition 2: two stable states and traveling waves that may “connect” them. However, the
Hutson–Vickers model is not written as a system of replicator–diffusion equations (hence
Proposition 2 does not apply), and a theoretical treatment presents rather formidable
difficulties. A computational study suffices, however, to demonstrate the remarkable rich-
ness of the model’s behavior. The most noteworthy point, as illustrated by the numerical
example presented hereafter, is that large or small players’ mobilities cannot be claimed
to be unambiguously good or bad for the evolution of cooperation.
Existence of invading waves of Tit For Tat
In contrast with the case of replicator–diffusion models, no general theorem is available
to guarantee the existence of traveling wave solutions to Hutson–Vickers equations. Yet
numerical procedures do provide evidence that invasion dynamics develop wave patterns.
As in Proposition 2, the sign of the wave speed determines whether the wave replaces AD
with TFT, or TFT with AD. Figure 2 shows how for a specific set of parameter values the
mobility rates influence the outcome of the game. To a certain extent, the results confirm
those of the previous section. For small or large µT the cooperators are defeated, whereas
for medium µT TFT successfully invades.
Hutson and Vickers (1995) gave the following interpretation of this result. Consider
what happens as µT is reduced at points A and B in Figure 2. These points indicate
stalemates, that is, traveling waves with zero speed. When µT is reduced, the wave front
of the TFT players steepens so that density is reduced in the leading edge of the wave.
The key factor is that at A the number of encounters between any given two players is
determined by the death rate, whereas at B it is determined by mobility. At B, the
getting-to-know function g and the number of AD–TFT pairs that have already met G
increase significantly, causing the per capita birth rate in TFT to increase. Thus the TFT
players have the advantage and a wave develops in which they advance. By contrast, at
A there is little change in functions g and G so that the per capita birth rate of TFT is
mainly influenced by the decrease in TFT density, which gives AD the advantage. The
same type of argument suggests that reducing µD is always bad for AD, which is consistent
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with Figure 2 but contrasts with conclusions drawn from the replicator–diffusion model.
5 Concluding Comments
The importance of spatial structure for the IPD has long been realized (see, e.g., Axelrod
1984). Intuitively, individual mobility in the IPD is expected to raise an insurmountable
obstacle to the spread of cooperation by allowing egoists to exploit cooperativeness and
escape retaliation (Houston 1993). Dugatkin and Wilson (1991) and Enquist and Leimar
(1993) addressed the issue, but their models had several limitations: only AD players
were mobile; mobility was represented implicitly through some traveling cost; and only
the question of the stability of TFT against AD was considered.
Reaction–diffusion models offer a natural framework to incorporate temporal and spa-
tial effects in games. These models represent players that move in space in a random
manner at a rate controlled by specific parameters. Their development is rooted in the
Taylor–Jonker replicator equations (1). Players’ mobility is included through the standard
diffusion approximation of spatial motion, which yields second-order derivatives with re-
spect to the spatial variable in Equations (2). We call the resulting system a “replicator–
diffusion model.” The reaction term can be modified further to allow for population
limitation through density-dependent payoffs (Cressman and Dash 1987).
Once the reaction–diffusionmodel has been set up, one can address the central question
in game theory: can an established population of one or several strategies be invaded by an
initial spatially limited distribution of individuals playing an alternative strategy? Propo-
sitions 1 to 3 provide some insights into this problem in the context of replicator–diffusion
models. The spatial dimension does not affect the stability of an internal strategy mix
(i.e., all strategies are represented), which is an ESS in the standard game (Proposition 1).
When there are only two strategies and both are ESSs in the nonspatial game, space dra-
matically alters the picture by allowing one strategy to displace the other (Proposition 2).
Finally, in games with three (or more) strategies, spatial patterns (that is, spatially het-
erogeneous but temporally “frozen” distributions of coexisting strategies) develop when
the replicator equation possesses a stable internal equilibrium that is not an ESS (Propo-
sition 3). These results have been extended to spatial games including logistic population
regulation (Cressman and Vickers 1997).
From the point of view of finding explicit, tractable invasibility criteria, two-strategy
replicator–diffusion models are quite remarkable. If there is only one pure ESS in the
standard game or if there is a mixed ESS, the stability property carries over nicely to the
spatial game. A difficulty arises when both pure strategies are ESSs in the nonspatial
game. In the spatial setting, the mathematical theory (Hutson and Vickers 1992) offers
three statements that constitute the core of Proposition 2: one strategy invades and
replaces the other (no coexistence); the invasion dynamics develop as a traveling front;
there is a clear-cut invasibility criterion based on the sign of the speed of the traveling
wave. On the basis of numerical simulations, the same invasibility rule proves to also apply
to the more involved Hutson–Vickers model. Therefore, in these models it is the emergence
of traveling waves that determines the evolutionary fate of individuals. The wave acts as
a “vehicle” for population conflict (which mainly occurs around the fringe of the wave).
In a sense, selection operates “at the level of the wave,” although the wave itself is not a
self-reproducing unit, just an expanding one. Obviously, the properties of waves are not in
the definition of the system, instead they are derived from the individuals’ behavioral and
demographic traits. A similar phenomenon has been observed in individual-based models
of host–parasitoid interactions where the formation of spiral waves determine the invasion
success of mutant parasitoids (Boerlijst et al. 1993).
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Other versions of the spatial IPD, designed as cellular automata, have recently been
issued (Lindgren and Nordahl 1994; Nakamaru et al. 1997; see Chapter 13 in Dieckmann
et al. 2000). Differences between these models and the reaction–diffusion approach lie
in various (biological) assumptions about individual mobility and the effect of the game
on individual life histories. The game pay-offs translate into a transmission rate (i.e.,
the probability of invading a neighboring site) in the model designed by Lindgren and
Nordahl (1994), whereas they determine mortality rates in the framework by Nakamaru
et al. (1997). The former model was analyzed though computer simulations; the latter
received an analytical treatment by means of pair-approximation techniques (see Chapters
13 and 18 in Dieckmann et al. 2000). In both models, mobility is restricted to the dis-
persal of one offspring into a vacant neighboring site. Consequently, neither model allows
connections to be drawn between the outcome of the game and different levels of indi-
vidual mobility. Van Baalen and Rand (1998) have also developed a pair-approximation
model of competition between altruists and non-altruists in a viscous population, in which
they incorporated a rate of mobility (the same for both types of individuals). Although
their system is not an iterated game, there is an interesting parallel between its behavior
and that of the replicator–diffusion model. Again, invasion appears to be governed by a
“spatially extended” Hamilton rule, where the coefficient of relatedness is recast into a
coefficient of reciprocation depending on the birth, death, and mobility rates – much like
the left-hand side of Equation (13). Also, the unit of selection becomes a “characteristic
cluster” whose structure is described by a stable distribution of pairs of neighboring site
occupancies, altruist–altruist, altruist–selfish, altruist–empty (a distribution that can be
calculated from the model parameters). Van Baalen and Rand’s model predicts that al-
truism can invade a selfish population background provided that the individual mobility
rate is close to some optimum, intermediate value. As in the reaction–diffusion models,
this ensures that the “scale of dispersal” is larger than the “scale of interaction.” In other
words, dispersal should be limited to guarantee a sufficient proportion of altruist–altruist
pairings, but strong enough to ensure that altruists can “export” themselves and propagate
through the environment.
The issue of invasion in spatial games arises from the study of a fascinating biological
enigma – the origin and maintenance of cooperation – and yields profound mathematical
challenges. The key relation between the existence of a traveling wave and invasion from
a localized cluster is widely accepted on the basis of overwhelming numerical simulations;
however, it has yet to be proved mathematically (see Chapter 22 in Dieckmann et al.
2000). The most urgent issue might be to further probe how the local mean-field descrip-
tion of spatial games based on reaction–diffusion models departs from the dynamics of
the underlying discrete system of interacting individuals. Individual models cannot reach
a sufficient level of generality, nor do they succeed at pointing out details at the indi-
vidual level that are critical for understanding the macroscopic dynamics. Intermediate
descriptions – for example, through moment or correlation equations (see Chapters 18 to
21 in Dieckmann et al. 2000) – have yet to be improved with respect to dealing with the
initial stages of invasion processes, when the invading population is limited to a small
area in space. In the meantime, we believe that the models of spatial games described in
this chapter represent a significant improvement over previous mathematical attempts to
describe the IPD and explain the evolution of cooperation.
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